Russia · Ukraine · The compound · the data layer

How to use this document

The main foundational report makes the methodology's categorization-shift argument through narrative and primary-source citation. This document makes the same argument through numbers. Every chain in the main report has a structural before/after that the configuration produces. This document gathers those before/after pairs in one place.

For the reader who wants the data first and the narrative second: this is your entry point. The main report is the integration. This document is the substrate.

The before/after framing is structural, not rhetorical. The methodology reads configurations by their cascade signatures, which are quantitative. When a configuration shifts, the data shifts, and the data shifts persistently, not transiently. The numbers in this document have all moved decisively, in one direction, in the four years since February 2022. Some of them have moved by an order of magnitude or more. That is what categorization shift looks like empirically.

Three caveats. First, some series are still moving, particularly the political-economic series (D2), the Russian internal economy series (D3), and the strategic configuration series (E1, E2, E3). The numbers in this document are current as of the composition date (June 2026) and the methodology treats them as in-progress measurements of a configuration still in Phase 4/Phase 5 transition. Second, market prices include cyclical and non-configuration noise. The €50/MWh TTF gas price (June 2026) reflects compound configuration substrate plus Middle East tensions plus seasonal storage dynamics. The data layer separates configuration-driven moves from cyclical noise where possible, but treats the dominant signal as the configuration substrate. Third, named-position outcomes (specific banks, specific corporates) anchor the data layer because they are auditable. The Uniper bailout cost is a public number. SocGen's Rosbank write-down is a public number. Rheinmetall's stock price is publicly observable. The methodology composes around these auditable points, not against them.

I · The war as it is — the human cost and operational tempo

Both sides converge on military casualty estimates approaching 1.2 million Russian and Ukrainian floors verified by independent intelligence and OHCHR; the war's human cost is the empirical ground every chain that follows stands on.

Fig. 1The scale of human cost — military and civilian casualties across both sides

Sources: UN OHCHR; CSIS; UK MoD; Netherlands MIVD; WSJ; Bloomberg; BBC; The Economist; Russia Matters

The empirical substrate of the war itself, casualties, drone and missile tempo, production and stockpile levels, interception trajectories, is the foundation on which all fourteen chains operate. This section reports the numbers as of mid-2026 with explicit source attribution, since the data is politically contested and the methodology's approach is to report ranges with provenance rather than single point estimates.

The convergence of independent Western intelligence estimates is the most credible signal for military casualties. OHCHR verified figures are the floor for civilian casualties. Ukrainian Air Force daily reporting (corroborated by ISW, ISIS, CSIS) is the most credible source for attack tempo. Russian Defence Intelligence (DIU) assessments are the most credible source for Russian missile production and stockpile levels.

Military casualties — Russian (cumulative through early 2026)

Convergence: Western intelligence estimates cluster at 1.0-1.2M total Russian military casualties with 325-500K killed. The 415,000 casualties in 2025 alone (Bloomberg) is itself nearly the size of the entire active US Army.

Military casualties — Ukrainian (cumulative through early 2026)

Range is wider for Ukraine because Kyiv has structural reasons to limit precise disclosure. The most credible mid-range estimate is CSIS January 2026: 140K killed, 500-600K total. Cumulative casualties at this scale against Ukraine's pre-war active military (250K) and total mobilizable population explain why labor and mobilization capacity is now the binding Phase 4 constraint on the Ukrainian side.

Civilian casualties — OHCHR verified (the floor)

OHCHR explicitly notes real numbers are higher; these are verified cases only. The April 2026 monthly rate (238 deaths) is the empirical proof that civilian impact has not abated four years in.

Internally displaced Ukrainians: 23,000 as of February 2026 (Russia Matters War Report Card), with 3,419 in the Kursk region.

Russian aerial attack tempo

Russian aerial production has scaled an order of magnitude across two years; the 2026 implied capacity is the empirical signature of an economy that has restructured around the war.

Fig. 2Russian aerial attack tempo — the curve is steepening, not flattening

Sources: Ukrainian Air Force daily reporting; ISIS production-capacity calculation; CSIS; Ukrainian Top Commander projection

The single most important number here is 5,312 drones launched in October 2025 alone (Ukrainian Air Force data via ABC News). The annual trajectory from ~12K in 2024 to 44K+ in 10 months of 2025 represents an approximately fourfold scaling, the structural expression of Russian production at the Alabuga (Tatarstan) facility of the Iranian-designed Shahed, plus the jet-powered Geran-3 evolution.

Russian ballistic and cruise missile launches

Sources: Ukrainian Air Force daily reports compiled by Critical Threats Project / Institute for the Study of War; Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) public assessments; Spasconsulting analysis of Zelenskyy disclosures (October 2025); Militarnyi procurement document analysis (October 2025); LIGA.net DIU coverage (June 2026).

Cost asymmetry — Operation Spiderweb and the unit-cost economics of the war

Fig. 3Cost asymmetry — Operation Spiderweb and the unit-cost economics of the war

Sources: Public unit-cost reporting: Patriot interceptor; Shahed/Geran; Gerbera decoy; Wild Hornets STING

Russian missile stockpile (DIU assessment, mid-April 2026)

Fig. 4Russian missile stockpile composition (DIU assessment, mid-April 2026)

Sources: DIU assessment, mid-April 2026

What the stockpile data shows: Russian missile production has outpaced operational consumption across multiple categories despite sustained mass-attack tempo. The Kinzhal stockpile doubling in six months is the cleanest single empirical signal that the Russian defense industrial base has structurally caught up to (and exceeded) the sanctions-constrained baseline. This is the empirical substrate behind the D3 finding that war-effort manufacturing grew 20% in 2025 value-added while non-war manufacturing grew 0.4%.

Ukrainian air defense — interception trajectory

The decline trajectory despite Ukrainian defensive innovation is the structural signal. Wild Hornets STING interceptor drones at ~$400/unit deployed at scale, mobile fire groups, distributed electronic warfare systems, all operational by mid-2025. Interception rates still declined because:

• Russian production tempo outpaced Ukrainian defensive scaling
• Shahed variants evolved (jet-powered Geran-3 at 230-310 mph speed, MANPADS-equipped self-defending variants, jamming-resistant 12-element antenna arrays)
• Cost asymmetry remains structural: Patriot interceptors up to $4M each vs $20K Shaheds vs $10K Gerbera decoys

The cost asymmetry is the substrate for the A1 asymmetric inversion cascade: Ukraine's $400-cost interceptor drone production against $20K Shahed attacks is the same cost-curve advantage that creates Western defense industrial demand for Ukrainian co-production frameworks.

Equipment losses (named categories, Russia Matters War Report Card data through April-May 2026)

What the warfare substrate means for the cascade chains

D3 · Russian internal economy: the 1.0-1.2M Russian military casualty figure combined with ~1M skilled-worker emigration represents approximately 2.5% of Russia's pre-war working-age population structurally removed from civilian economic capacity in four years. This is the empirical proximate cause of the labor market exhaustion the CBR governor flagged in June 2025.

A1 · Asymmetric inversion: the cost asymmetry visible in the interception data (Patriot $4M vs Shahed $20K vs STING $400) is the same cost-curve dynamic that makes Ukrainian defense industrial integration with European primes structurally attractive, Ukrainian iteration cycles match the evolving threat at the price points Western primes cannot reach.

E1 · Hybrid threshold normalization: Russian Shahed production capacity of 404 units/day means the same capability set is available against any other adversary, including NATO members. The empirical substrate of mass-drone-attack capability is now structurally present in the European security environment.

E3 · Peace-plan bifurcation: Russian missile stockpile growth (Kinzhal doubling in 6 months) is empirical evidence that the "economic exhaustion accelerates settlement" thesis is operating less strongly than the 2025 mid-year analysis suggested. Russian defense-industrial production sustainability through 2026 changes the bifurcation timeline. The methodology continues to read 12-18 months as the fork-closure window, but the substrate suggests Branch B (continued war) is structurally more sustainable from Russia's defense-industrial side than the broader macro picture would indicate.

Section I glossary (abbreviations)

OHCHR, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; canonical floor for civilian casualty verification.

ISW, Institute for the Study of War (Washington); daily warfare assessment publications.

ISIS, Institute for the Study of Strategic Issues; tracks Russian military production capacity.

CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington).

DIU / GUR / HUR, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine; the Ukrainian MoD's military intelligence directorate.

MIVD, Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (Netherlands Military Intelligence and Security Service).

AEI, American Enterprise Institute; parent organisation of Critical Threats Project.

MoD, Ministry of Defence (used contextually for UK, Russia, Ukraine, Netherlands).

9M723, Russian GRAU designation for the Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile.

Kh-101 / Kh-102, Russian air-launched stealth cruise missiles (Kh-102 is nuclear variant).

Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, Russian air-launched hypersonic missile.

RM-48U, Russian repurposed strike missile based on S-300PM / S-400 air-defence platforms.

S-300PM / S-400, Russian long-range surface-to-air missile systems.

FPV, first-person view (drone category, operator-piloted via headset).

BCM, billion cubic metres (gas volume).

II · Five canonical configuration before/after pairs

Five before/after pairs that crystallize the configuration shift across the most important chains. Each pair operates at the named-position altitude where the cascade signature is most visible.

1. Rheinmetall — the canonical defense industrial winner

Fig. 5Rheinmetall — €85 → €2,008 peak → €1,202 (canonical defense industrial winner)

Sources: XETRA RHM.DE historical price; Rheinmetall IR

The single cleanest expression of the A1 + A2 + A3 cascade (asymmetric inversion + fiscal cascade + bilateral defense aid as industrial integration) in any single named position.

Sources: Rheinmetall investor relations, Macrotrends RNMBY historical data, MarketBeat 5-year return data (+2,397% over 5 years to October 2025).

What the data shows: a single defense industrial company has traveled, in four years, from a 1.3% of GDP German defense spending baseline to a 3.2-3.5% trajectory locked in via constitutional debt-brake reform. The stock price absorbed the entire cascade, fiscal commitment, bilateral aid composition, asymmetric integration with Ukrainian iteration cycles. The €135 billion projected end-2026 backlog is the structural lock-in: that backlog represents committed multi-year orders that any peace settlement scenario cannot easily reverse. The 2026 stock price retracement from the 2025 peak reflects sectoral consolidation and selective investor positioning, not configuration reversal.

2. Uniper — the canonical energy cascade casualty

Fig. 6Uniper cascade — €51.5B nationalization (canonical energy cascade casualty)

Sources: Bundestag protocols; German Federal Ministry of Finance; company disclosures

The single cleanest expression of the B1 cascade (energy reconfiguration) at corporate scale.

Sources: Bloomberg "Uniper Posts €40 Billion Loss as Russia Throttles Gas Supply" (3 Nov 2022); Reuters "Germany's Uniper sees bailout cost hitting $53 bln" (23 Nov 2022); Press Reader and Africanews documentation of nationalization timeline.

What the data shows: one of the largest single-corporation losses in German corporate history, absorbed by the German taxpayer at sovereign-fiscal scale within nine months of the configuration activating. The Uniper outcome is the empirical proof that the energy cascade was not a price problem, it was a configuration shift that the corporate sector could not absorb. Wintershall Dea (BASF subsidiary, sold to Harbour Energy 2023 after €7B+ writedowns), Engie, OMV (smaller Nord Stream 2 stakes, also written down) produced parallel but smaller cascade signatures across the same period.

3. TTF gas — the regime change in European energy pricing

Fig. 7TTF gas — €16 → €343 peak → ~€50 (the regime change in European energy pricing)

Sources: ICE TTF settlement

The single cleanest expression of how the energy reconfiguration changed the substrate of European industrial competitiveness.

Sources: ICE TTF futures historical data, Trading Economics commodity tracker, Eurostat energy data, Reuters/Bloomberg historical price data.

What the data shows: the price level is structurally rebased at 2-3× the pre-2022 baseline, with new volatility regime that reflects fundamental supply restructuring. Mid-East tensions in June 2026 are pushing the current price to ~€50/MWh, but the baseline that European industrial users now plan against is not the 2019-21 baseline. It is the new structurally higher level. Every European industrial sector with material energy intensity (chemicals, fertilizers, ceramics, glass, steel, aluminum) has had to absorb this regime change permanently. The named-business outcomes, BASF's gradual European capacity reduction, Yara fertilizer European production cuts, ArcelorMittal capacity shifts, are the operational expression of the price regime change.

4. Russian Central Bank rate — the empirical proof of configuration overheating

Fig. 8CBR policy rate — 9.5% → 21% → 15% (the empirical proof of configuration overheating)

Sources: Bank of Russia policy-rate history

The single cleanest expression of how the Russian war economy distorted the central bank's monetary policy stance to historically unprecedented levels.

Sources: Central Bank of Russia announcements, Trading Economics CBR rate history, Atlantic Council "Russian economy in 2025" report.

What the data shows: the October 2024 peak at 21% is the highest CBR rate in the post-Soviet history of the institution. The rate trajectory is not a monetary policy story, it is a configuration story. The CBR was using rate policy to suppress demand from a fiscal-stimulus-driven economy (military Keynesianism), with the elevated real rate (12% at peak) reflecting the structural inability of monetary policy to compensate for sustained fiscal expansion. The CBR governor's June 2025 statement that Russian "economic resources, labor and production capital, are exhausted" is the explicit central bank acknowledgement of configuration-driven economic constraint.

5. Ukrainian displacement — the substrate transformation

The EU Temporary Protection Directive was dormant for 21 years before this configuration activated it; 4.33 million people are now inside an emergency mechanism the system never built to hold structurally.

Fig. 9Ukrainian displacement (D1) — 4.33M people the directive was never meant to hold

Sources: Eurostat monthly TPD statistics; UNHCR refugee data

The single cleanest expression of how a discrete event (Feb 2022 invasion) produced an irreversible substrate shift in European population composition.

Sources: Eurostat monthly TPD statistics (most recent: 31 March 2026), UNHCR refugee data, Visit Ukraine compilation.

What the data shows: the EU Temporary Protection Directive, designed in 2001 and never activated for 21 years, became operational in March 2022 and has been continuously extended since, with the structural expectation that some substantial fraction of displaced Ukrainians will not return. The substrate transformation is not the discrete event of displacement. It is the four-year integration of 4.33 million Ukrainians into European labor markets, housing systems, education infrastructure, and social services, and the operational decisions that European member states are now making about long-term legal status, labor integration, and structural absorption.

Section II glossary (abbreviations)

TTF, Title Transfer Facility (Dutch virtual gas trading point); European gas pricing benchmark.

CBR, Central Bank of Russia (Bank of Russia / Банк России).

TPD, EU Temporary Protection Directive (Council Directive 2001/55/EC); activated 4 March 2022 for displaced Ukrainians.

ECB, European Central Bank.

III · Before/after data by chain

Fig. 10Fourteen-chain architecture — 5 clusters · 14 chains A1-E3 · 6 cross-coupling triangles

Sources: BearingA compound methodology (fourteen-chain framework)

Fig. 11Phase architecture timeline — 12 years, 5 phases, Nov 2013 → ~2028

Sources: BearingA phase architecture over public event chronology

Cluster A · Industrial reconfiguration

A1 · The asymmetric inversion (Ukrainian defense industry as exporter)

Sources: Kyiv School of Economics Institute 2025 estimates, Quwa Defense (May 2026), Domain-b (May 2026), CBS News (April 2026), Kyiv Independent (Feb 2026). Pre-2022 baseline: CSIS "How Ukraine Rebuilt Its Military Acquisition System Around Commercial Technology" (12 Feb 2025). Drone-specific manufacturer count: Mykhailo Fedorov direct statement via Georgetown Security Studies Review (July 2025) and BraveTech EU joint platform announcement (August 2025); YouControl Ukrainian business registry via OSW Centre for Eastern Studies (annual aerospace enterprise registrations).

What the data shows: a sector that was Soviet-legacy state-dominated in 2021 has become a commercial-technology-based industrial provider that NATO members are integrating with at structural altitude. The capacity number ($55B projected 2026) exceeds the absolute size of most European defense industrial bases. The iteration cycle (6 weeks per drone generation) compares to multi-year procurement cycles in traditional Western defense industrial systems.

A2 · The Hague 5% fiscal cascade (European defense spending)

Sources: EPThinkTank "EU Member States' defence budgets" (March 2026), Atlantic Council NATO defense spending tracker (April 2026), Intereconomics "Can Europe Deliver NATO's Five Percent?" (Vol. 61, 2026), Scope Ratings sovereign analysis (June 2025).

What the data shows: structural increase across all European NATO members in four years, with the trajectory locked in through 2035 via the Hague Summit commitment. Norway became the first European ally to surpass US defense spending per capita in 2025 (Atlantic Council tracker, April 2026). The fiscal cascade differentiation, Germany via constitutional debt-brake reform absorbing the increase; France under existing fiscal constraint; Poland through accelerated baseline raise; Spain opting out, is the political-economic substrate that feeds D2.

Sovereign credit signature: Scope Ratings analysis (June 2025) projects that achieving the 3.5% NATO target will require an additional 1.3% of GDP per year on average across EU NATO members, raising annual European defense spending from ~$360B (current) to $600B+ (target).

A3 · Bilateral defense aid as industrial integration architecture

Kiel Institute Ukraine Support Tracker data through April 2026:

Regional share evolution of European military aid:

• Western Europe (UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, etc.): 2022 share ~64% → 2025 share ~62% (Germany + UK = two-thirds of Western European share)
• Northern Europe (Nordics, Baltics): 2022 share 18% → 2023+ share 36%+
• Eastern Europe: 2022 share 17% → 2025 share ~2%
• Southern Europe: 2022 share ~1% → 2025 share ~0%

Sources: Kiel Institute "Ukraine support after 4 years of war: Europe steps up" (11 Feb 2026); Kiel Institute Ukraine Support Tracker Military Aid update (April 2026); Kiel Institute energy aid analysis (16 April 2026).

What the data shows: the absolute aid envelope is sustained (Europe averaged €2B/month real military aid Jan-April 2026 vs €2.4B/month 2025), but the composition has structurally shifted, US share collapsed, Northern Europe share doubled, financial aid composition shifted toward Japanese ERA loan tranches and EU capital-markets-based financing rather than frozen-assets-backed mechanisms. Energy support reached €1B in winter 2025/26 alone, 42% of humanitarian aid composition.

Cluster B · Energy and resource cascade

B1 · The energy reconfiguration

Already covered extensively in Section I (Uniper and TTF). Additional structural data:

Sources: Eurostat energy data, Reuters/Bloomberg corporate reporting, Euronews "EU lawmakers agree to ban Russian gas imports by 2027" (3 Dec 2025), GIS Reports (21 April 2026), Trading Economics commodity tracker.

B2 · The critical raw materials cascade

EU critical raw materials imports from Russia (Eurostat data via Investigate Europe): €13.7 billion between March 2022 and July 2023 alone, a period when European sanctions architecture covered oil, coal, steel, timber, but not most of the 34 EU-classified critical raw materials. Norilsk Nickel routed $7.6 billion in nickel and copper to EU via Finnish and Swiss subsidiaries; $3 billion+ in palladium, platinum, and rhodium through Zurich airport during the same period.

Named-position structural exposure: Airbus continued procuring Russian titanium (Vsmpo-Avisma) through at least 2023 due to absence of alternative supply at scale for aerospace-grade titanium sponge. Boeing severed direct procurement in 2022. The aerospace titanium supply chain remains partially Russian-origin throughout 2024-2026, creating sustained Western commercial aerospace strategic vulnerability.

What the data shows: the price moves in early 2022 were sharp and have partially normalized, but the trade flow data reveals that the sanctions architecture has been structurally porous on critical raw materials. The cascade is operating through trade routing and gradual diversification rather than through immediate supply-cliff dynamics.

B3 · The grain and food security cascade

Sources: USDA grain trade data, S&P Global Commodity Insights, Ukrainian Grain Association, Romanian port authority data.

What the data shows: Ukrainian agricultural export capacity has substantially recovered through alternative routes despite Russian termination of the BSGI in July 2023. Russian wheat exports have grown to fill MENA market gap, with Russian agricultural revenue partly compensating for hydrocarbon export decline. The Polish-Ukrainian agricultural trade tensions of 2023-2024 (farmer protests, EU temporary import restrictions) revealed the political-economic friction of the alternative routing, now substantially resolved but with structural implications for EU agricultural integration discussions in Ukrainian accession negotiations.

Cluster C · Financial and capital architecture

C1 · The custody architecture precedent

Sources: ABA Banking Journal "Fortress Russia" (10 June 2022), World Gold Council quarterly data, IMF COFER quarterly reserves data, SWIFT RMB Tracker, ECB sanctions analysis, Centre for European Reform Reparations Loan analysis (18 Dec 2025), Reuters/Market Screener EU frozen-assets coverage.

What the data shows: the Bank of Russia executed the most aggressive sovereign sanctions-proofing strategy in modern history between 2014 and 2022, and still lost approximately half its reserves overnight to multilateral coordination in February 2022. The behavioral response from non-Western central banks since 2022 is empirically visible: record-pace gold purchases sustained for four years, persistent dollar reserve share decline, yuan share growth in trade settlement infrastructure. The custody architecture precedent has produced a measurable shift in reserve composition decisions across non-Western sovereigns.

C2 · The shadow economy and parallel financial system

Sources: Newsweek (May 2026), ACLED Baltic Sentry enforcement data, World Bank bilateral trade data, Western intelligence agency assessments via published reports, RUSI Iranian-Russian cooperation analyses.

What the data shows: the parallel financial and trade system has become structurally significant in absolute scale. The Russia-Turkey trade volume nearly doubled. Bilateral trade flows with former Soviet republics display asymmetric patterns characteristic of reexport, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan particularly. The shadow fleet has grown to operational scale that requires sustained NATO naval presence to enforce against. Iranian and North Korean defense industrial integration with Russia operates entirely outside the Western sanctions architecture.

C3 · The European banking exit pattern

Sources: Cyprus Mail (Reuters) "Which international banks are exposed to Russia?" (2 March 2022); Euromoney "Why are Raiffeisen and UniCredit still in Russia?" (Nov-Dec 2022); The Bell "Foreign banks in Russia after four years of the war" (6 April 2026); S&P Global Market Intelligence "EU banks with Russia exposure boost profits even as regulatory pressure grows" (10 July 2024); BIS bank exposure data.

What the data shows: the exit pattern is structurally differentiated rather than uniform. SocGen exited cleanly with a €3.1B capital hit. UniCredit and Intesa reduced exposure by 10× and 11× respectively but retain residual operations whose profitability constrains full exit. RBI's structural retention is the canonical case: 40% of its Russian subsidiary's assets are trapped liquidity at the Bank of Russia (839B rubles, $10.6B), a position that cannot be released through normal channels and that effectively constrains group-level strategic flexibility. The configuration of European banking exposure to Russia is now permanent at this differentiated structure until a peace settlement resolves the trapped-liquidity question.

Cluster D · Political-economic and social cascade

D1 · The Ukrainian displacement cascade

Already covered in Section I. Additional structural data:

Sources: Eurostat monthly TPD statistics (31 March 2026), UNHCR refugee data, Ukrainian government internal displacement reporting, German federal labor statistics, ETIAS analysis of TPD legal architecture.

What the data shows: Ukraine has lost approximately 30% of its effective population in four years through casualties (200K-500K military), occupation (territories under Russian control), and displacement (6M total displaced abroad). The cumulative German fiscal absorption (~€30B) is approximately 15% of total bilateral Ukraine support globally. The TPD legal architecture activation is itself a categorical shift, a legal framework dormant for 21 years became operationally significant overnight and is being structurally extended.

D2 · The European political-economic absorption

Pre/post vote share trajectory for major far-right and right-populist parties:

Sources: International Bar Association "The year of elections: The rise of Europe's far right"; ECPS "A Tipping Point for Far-Right Populism in France" (4 March 2025); Al Majalla "A rising far right is reshaping Europe's political landscape" (20 Nov 2025); ECFR "Rise to the challengers" (29 Jan 2026); TIME "Why Europe's Far Right Will Keeps Rising" (11 March 2026).

What the data shows: simultaneous gains across multiple countries despite different national political circumstances, the cascade signature of configuration-driven rather than country-specific voter coalition shifts. The structural significance is not government formation in individual countries but the political-economic constraint set on every European compound-policy decision now operating against 20-30% of the electorate in multiple member states actively opposing the configuration's continuation.

The Hungarian reversal (April 2026 pro-EU opposition victory) is the single counter-trend in the dataset, an empirical reminder that Phase 5 resolution scenarios are open, not closed.

D3 · The Russian internal economy distortion

Fig. 12Two-track Russian economy — war manufacturing +20% vs non-war +0.4% (D3 chain)

Sources: Rosstat manufacturing series (war-effort vs non-war split)

Sources: World Bank Fall 2025 Economic Update (October 2025), IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2026), Central Bank of Russia announcements via Trading Economics, BOFIT "Forecast for Russia 2026-2028" (30 March 2026), Atlantic Council "Russian economy in 2025" (December 2025), European Leadership Network "Understanding Russia's wartime economy" (March 2026), Meduza "Stalling growth" (30 Dec 2025), Moscow Times "Russia's Economy in 2026" (January 2026).

What the data shows: the two-track economy is the structural feature. War-effort manufacturing grew 20% in 2025 value-added; everything else combined grew 0.4%. The Russian central bank explicitly using monetary policy (21% peak rate) to suppress demand from a fiscal-stimulus-driven defense economy is the empirical proof that the war economy is overheating from a configuration perspective even as topline GDP slows. The CBR governor's June 2025 statement that "economic resources, labor and production capital, are exhausted" is the formal acknowledgement of configuration-driven economic constraint at sovereign altitude.

D4 · The Ukrainian domestic economy and financial-sector state

Sources: National Bank of Ukraine, Financial Stability Report, June 2026 (SOURCE 212, approved by NBU Financial Stability Committee 23 June 2026); NBU Inflation Report (April 2026) for forecast trajectory; historical baselines from prior NBU FSR series and IMF Article IV Ukraine consultations. Where the 2021 baseline is not directly stated in the June 2026 FSR, the reference value is a NBU historical series indicator held for orientation and marked as such in narrative below.

What the data shows: the Ukrainian domestic economy in 2026 is running a two-track configuration that mirrors the Russian one across the border but on inverted mechanics. Where Russia is fiscal-stimulus-defense-overheating being throttled by 15-21% CBR rate, Ukraine is reconstruction-and-defense growth being sustained by external financing that offsets a 12-of-GDP budget deficit (21% ex-grants), the NBU holding at 15% to defend a hryvnia running 44.75 against a UAH that has moved 60%+ against the dollar since 2021. Q1 2026 GDP contracted 0.6%, first contraction since 2023, on Russian infrastructure attacks against the energy grid; NBU revised full-year growth 1.8% → 1.3% in April. Inflation 8.2% May, forecast re-acceleration to 9.4% year-end.

The Ukrainian banking sector state is resilient at supervisor altitude: capital adequacy 17%+, NPL 15.3% (fifteen-year low), LCR 269% median, corporate hryvnia loan growth exceeding 30% for near a year, the longest credit expansion in fifteen years. But the concentration mechanics tell the compound story: 33% of bank assets depend on public finances (25% domestic government debt securities, plus SOE loans, 5-7-9% subsidised lending covering a third of the hryvnia corporate portfolio, and eOselia mortgages at 83% of the mortgage market). This is highest sovereign concentration in Europe against a European median of 17%. Bank sector net RoE compressed to 22% (all banks) / 15% (non-state) by the 50% corporate income tax, below cost of capital for many banks, which the NBU explicitly names as undermining investment attractiveness ahead of state-owned bank privatisation. The compound is not solvency risk. It is capital-generation compression at the exact moment the sector needs to build capital to meet EU-harmonised capital buffers (P2R + conservation + systemic importance + countercyclical) phasing in 2027-2028.

Ukrainian real sector companies are financially healthier than the war-narrative suggests: ~50% of assets and ~60% of revenue at strong/excellent financial health per NBU's seven-indicator population assessment across ~180,000 companies 2021-2025. The regional distribution matters, Zakarpattia at 68% strong/excellent asset share versus frontline regions at 43%. This is a substantially bimodal country economically: the western oblasts operating at pre-war-comparable financial health, the eastern and southern frontier operating on a different configuration entirely.

The customer side runs the counter-intuitive move. Real household income is up 10% YoY early 2026. Wage bill for corporate and public sector employees is up 22% in the first four months. Consumer sentiment is above pre-full-scale-invasion levels. Retail trade is expanding turnover and revenue at stable profitability. Household debt-to-GDP sits at 4.5%, well below European levels; loans finance only 1% of consumer spending. This is not an economy in aggregate compression. What is compressed is concentrated, fuel absorbing wage gains at +33.4% YoY, water tariffs jumping 15.3% in a single month, energy-disruption-driven housing purchase volatility (Q4 2025 largest deal volume since 2022; Q1 2026 shrunk sharply on Russian aerial assaults dampening appetite). The Ukrainian consumer has more nominal and real income than six months ago, and specific line items absorbing that gain before it reaches discretionary construction and durable-goods spend. This is important for how the compound reaches the Ukrainian real economy: the sell-side story is segmented, not aggregate.

CBAM Phase 2 is the structural cost floor arriving on Ukrainian metallurgy exports. NBU explicitly estimates ~$800M loss to the sector in 2026 alone; potential EU duty-free quota reduction on Ukrainian steel would compound the pressure on above-quota tariff exposure. This is not a cycle. It is permanent structural cost on the sector that carries the largest share of Ukrainian goods exports at current commodity prices, the same sector the reconstruction pull is supposed to feed. Domestic steel consumption grew 12% in 2025 to 3.4M tonnes on reconstruction demand; rebar segment +14% to 754K tonnes. Domestic hot-rolled steel prices at 41,700 UAH/t (+18.6% YTD), profile pipes at 46,100 UAH/t (+20.4%), round pipes at 47,100 UAH/t (+19.9%), the price trajectory driven simultaneously by capacity compression from 2025 infrastructure damage, energy input costs at structurally elevated levels, and CBAM-related pass-through beginning to filter through supplier price sheets ahead of Q4 2026 full absorption.

External financing is the load-bearing variable. The Ukraine Support Loan (€90B, Hungary unblocked following April 2026 elections, first €3.2B disbursed June, €16.7B expected 2026 budget support), IMF EFF new four-year program (staff-level agreement first review), the Ukraine Facility architecture, and ERA loan tranches together fund the >$53B annual external financing envelope Ukraine requires. Contingent on reform pace per Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies and Ukraine Facility conditions. EU accession negotiations were formalised 15 June 2026, Cluster 1 (Fundamentals) opened, remaining 33 clusters July, with the national programme requiring adoption of ~1,500 EU acts. The compound at Ukrainian domestic altitude does not resolve through domestic dynamics. It resolves through whether the financing schedule, the reform pace, and the EU accession trajectory hold together across 2026 and 2027.

Cluster E · Strategic configuration

E1 · The hybrid threshold normalization

Sources: International Bar Association "NATO moves to counter hybrid threats" (14 October 2025); CEPA "The Hybrid Threat Imperative" (6 December 2025); Newsweek shadow fleet analysis (May 2026); Wikipedia "2026 Ukrainian drone incursions into the Baltic states" documented incident list.

What the data shows: the operational space below the Article 5 threshold has become a sustained operating environment rather than a series of exceptional incidents. Munich Re, Swiss Re, Lloyd's market all face structural underwriting gap on hybrid-sabotage risk that catastrophe models do not cover. European critical infrastructure operators are absorbing operational security spend in categories that did not previously exist.

E2 · The transatlantic split as structural alliance reconfiguration

Sources: Kiel Institute Ukraine Support Tracker (April 2026); Atlantic Council NATO defense spending tracker (9 April 2026); CSIS "The Unfinished Plan for Peace in Ukraine" (9 February 2026); UK House of Commons Library "Ukraine peace talks" (6 March 2026); Pravda Denmark Narvik Agreement coverage (28 May 2026).

What the data shows: the post-1949 transatlantic alliance architecture has been structurally reconfigured. For the first time in 76 years of NATO history, a European ally (Norway) surpassed the United States in defense spending per capita in 2025. The EU's pivot from frozen-assets-backed Ukraine financing to capital-markets-financed loans is the structural operational expression of European financial autonomy. New bilateral European defense agreements (Norway-France, LEAP, CORPUS) are organizing capability outside the traditional US-led NATO planning framework.

E3 · The peace-plan bifurcation

The peace-plan bifurcation is forward-looking; the empirical data is the corpus precedent (Minsk) and the current state of negotiations.

Sources: Springer Nature "War, diplomacy, and more war: why did the Minsk agreements fail?" (15 November 2024); Peace News Network "When peace processes fail: Donbas and the Minsk agreements" (2 November 2023); CSIS "The Unfinished Plan for Peace in Ukraine" (9 February 2026); UK House of Commons Library "Ukraine peace talks" (6 March 2026); Wikipedia "2026 Russo-Ukrainian truce" timeline.

What the data shows: eleven years and seven major rounds of negotiations without sustainable settlement. Minsk I/II is the high-confidence corpus precedent for how the current negotiations are likely to fail, the same structural sequencing dispute (Russian political-first vs Ukrainian military-first roadmap) that produced Minsk failure operates in the 2025-2026 talks. The bifurcation point is open; the methodology projects fork closure within 12-18 months of current state (June 2026).

Section III glossary (abbreviations)

Cluster A

LEAP, European-Ukrainian co-production initiative (defence industrial, early-mid 2026).

Cluster B

LNG, liquefied natural gas.

FSRU, floating storage and regasification unit (LNG import infrastructure).

ESPO, East Siberia-Pacific Ocean blend (Russian crude grade delivered through Pacific terminals).

LME, London Metal Exchange.

BSGI, Black Sea Grain Initiative (UN-Turkey-Russia-Ukraine agreement, July 2022 - July 2023).

VSMPO, VSMPO-AVISMA (Russian titanium producer; ~28% global aerospace-grade titanium supply).

Cluster C

SWIFT, Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (Belgium-based interbank messaging).

OFAC, US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (US sanctions enforcement).

ERA, Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan (G7 facility for Ukraine, October 2024).

PBoC, People's Bank of China.

RBI, Reserve Bank of India.

GCC, Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE).

Cluster D

AfD, Alternative für Deutschland (German right-populist party).

RN, Rassemblement National (French right-populist party).

PVV, Partij voor de Vrijheid / Party for Freedom (Dutch right-populist party, led by Geert Wilders).

SPD / CDU / CSU, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands / Christlich Demokratische Union / Christlich-Soziale Union (German governing parties).

Cluster E

NATO Article 4, Treaty article triggering consultation among allies on perceived security threats.

NATO Article 5, Treaty article establishing collective defence.

IV · The Psychology cluster and the historical record

Section III documents the chains, the specific causal transmission paths through which the compound substrate composes across industrial, energy, financial, political-economic, and strategic domains. This section documents what the chains transmit through. The Psychology cluster is not another chain; it is the operating-environment conductance that every chain transmits through, and its empirical signature appears in cross-domain decision indicators rather than in any single domain's data. The historical regime-shift record is what the cluster's signature means against the longer arc of how previous compound configurations have actually resolved, empirical, not theoretical. Both belong here because the methodology's temporal claim, which Vol I §V.5 develops, requires both: a current signature that says the cluster is activated, and a historical record that says what cluster-activated configurations actually do over time.

A · The decision-cost proxies — six series, Russia-Ukraine compound 2018-2026

The Psychology cluster's signature is cumulative decision-deferral across the operating environment. Six empirical series, read together, describe one coherent pattern: capital that would have been deployed under historical decision patterns is instead held; commitments that would have been made are postponed; expectations that would have been positive are sustained-negative. Each series captures one face of the same underlying signature.

IV.A.1 · Economic Policy Uncertainty index — the textual signature

Sources: Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., & Davis, S. J. (2016). "Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty." Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(4), 1593-1636; Baker-Bloom-Davis EPU index monthly data at policyuncertainty.com; country-variant methodology papers.

What the data shows: a textual proxy for policy uncertainty has remained 1.5-2.0 standard deviations above its 2010s mean continuously for over four years, with European country-specific variants showing particularly sustained elevation through September 2022 (the European energy crisis), October 2023 (the ECB tightening cycle), and the 2024-2025 European political cycle. This is not the EPU signature of a transient shock. Brexit produced ~24 months of elevation before partial mean reversion; the GFC produced ~30 months; COVID produced ~18 months before sharp mean reversion through 2021. Four years of sustained elevation has no parallel in the post-1985 EPU record except the regime-shift transitions the historical record (Section IV.B below) documents independently. The mechanism is option-theoretic and well-documented in Bloom (2009) and subsequent literature, when uncertainty is high, the option value of waiting before committing to irreversible decisions rises, deferring capex, hiring, M&A, and durables consumption across the operating environment.

IV.A.2 · Business confidence — the European sustained depression

Sources: ifo Institute Munich Business Climate Index (monthly); INSEE Business Climate Indicator (monthly); European Commission DG ECFIN Economic Sentiment Indicator (monthly); OECD Business Confidence Indicator from CLI database (monthly).

What the data shows: European business confidence has remained below its 2015-2019 mean continuously since Q2 2022, with the German ifo Business Climate Index dropping from approximately 98 in January 2022 to 83 by September 2022, the European energy crisis trough, and recovering only to approximately 89 by mid-2026, well below the 95-100 range that characterised the 2015-2019 recovery period. The INSEE indicator and Eurozone ESI show similar but slightly less pronounced trajectories. The OECD aggregate, which includes United States, Japanese, and other members not directly compound-exposed, has performed materially better than the European country-level reads and is now approximately at its decade mean, the cross-sectional differentiation between OECD-aggregate and European-country reads is itself the signature, telling us that the depression is European-compound-specific rather than global. Persistence over 50+ months is what distinguishes this episode from prior confidence shocks: the operating environment has accepted the compound as the operating condition rather than as a transient shock, which is itself the structural feature the Psychology cluster captures.

IV.A.3 · Corporate cash holdings — the cumulative deferral

Sources: S&P Capital IQ corporate cash holdings (S&P 500 + STOXX 600 non-financial aggregates, quarterly); FactSet Earnings Insight weekly S&P 500 cash reporting; company-level 10-K and annual report disclosures.

What the data shows: S&P 500 non-financial corporate cash holdings have built from approximately $1.5-1.7 trillion pre-2022 to a peak of approximately $2.0-2.2 trillion in 2024-2025, with partial mean reversion as equity markets recovered but with cash levels not normalising to pre-2022 baselines even as some macro indicators (inflation, growth) stabilised. STOXX 600 non-financial aggregate cash reached approximately €1.4 trillion at year-end 2024 against the €1.1 trillion 2018-2021 baseline. The 30-40% elevation in absolute holdings represents, at the aggregate level, several hundred billion dollars of capital that would, under historical decision patterns, have been deployed by mid-2026 but instead sits as cash or in elevated money-market allocations. This is the latent demand overhang the methodology identifies and that the Vol I §V.5 argument will draw on, capital waiting for substrate crystallization rather than committing to the current configuration. The composition shift toward Treasury and money-market allocation (rising from approximately 30-35% of corporate cash to approximately 45-50% over the period) confirms the defensive posture: the cash is being held for option value, not for operational liquidity.

IV.A.4 · Global M&A deal volumes — strategic decision deferral

Sources: Refinitiv Deals Intelligence quarterly aggregate reports + deal-level database; Bloomberg M&A League Tables (monthly); Dealogic global M&A data; Mergermarket deal-level database + commentary.

What the data shows: global M&A deal volumes are the most direct observable measure of strategic-decision execution at corporate scale, and the four-year pattern is unambiguous, 25-35% sustained volume depression against the 2018-2021 trend baseline, with mega-deal compression most pronounced (2023 saw the lowest mega-deal count since 2013) and cross-border deal share compressed materially. Each deal that did not happen represents a multinational corporation, a financial sponsor, or a strategic acquirer that postponed a multi-year strategic positioning bet that would, under historical decision patterns, have been executed. The cumulative deferral over four years compounds to thousands of postponed strategic decisions, with sector-specific differentiation that itself carries information: defense industrial M&A elevated (Rheinmetall + Hensoldt strategic acquisitions, BAE-Ball Aerospace, Northrop-Aerojet, RTX restructuring), consumer-facing and general industrial M&A subdued. The pattern matches the Psychology cluster signature: decisions that survive the compound get made; decisions that depend on substrate resolution get deferred.

IV.A.5 · Global IPO market activity — capital-formation deferral

Sources: Renaissance Capital US IPO market tracker (weekly + quarterly); Dealogic ECM database (global IPO transactions, daily-level data); EY Global IPO Trends (quarterly aggregate report); PwC IPO Watch (quarterly); regional exchange disclosures.

What the data shows: the IPO market is where the Psychology cluster signature reads most starkly. Global IPO count fell from approximately 1,800-2,000 in 2021 to approximately 1,100 in 2024, a 45% peak-to-trough decline, with capital raised through IPOs falling from approximately $450 billion in 2021 to approximately $90-100 billion in 2024, a 78% decline. The US IPO market specifically was largely closed for venture-backed technology companies through most of 2022-2024, reopening selectively in 2025 with approximately 40 venture-backed tech IPOs against the 150+ that typified pre-2022 years. The European IPO market remained particularly depressed, with national exchanges in Frankfurt, Paris, and Amsterdam seeing sustained low activity. Unlike the rapid IPO market reopening that followed COVID (which saw a sharp dislocation followed by record activity within 12 months), the post-2022 trough has been four years long and only partially recovered. The persistence is the signature: this is not a transient liquidity event but a sustained capital-formation overhang reflecting decision-deferral at the most committed capital-decision altitude.

IV.A.6 · Corporate capex / sales ratios — selective deployment

Sources: S&P Capital IQ capex aggregation (S&P 500 + STOXX 600, quarterly); company 10-K and annual report capital expenditure disclosures; BloombergNEF for energy transition capex; SIPRI for defense industrial capex.

What the data shows: corporate capex/sales ratios are the most direct measure of physical-capital deployment, and the cross-sectional pattern across 2022-2026 carries the methodology signature most directly. Where the compound has created clear opportunity that survives substrate resolution, defense industrial, capex flows aggressively, with Rheinmetall's announced capacity expansions, BAE's UK and US capex programmes, Thales's electronic warfare and defense electronics expansion, and Lockheed Martin's munitions-line expansion all running at materially elevated rates against their 2017-2019 baselines. Where the compound has created uncertainty rather than opportunity, general industrial, consumer-facing, energy-intensive non-defense, capex defers, with European industrial sectors particularly cautious and the STOXX 600 ex-defense capex/sales ratio sustained below its 2017-2019 baseline. The bifurcation is the signature. This is not aggregate capex retrenchment (which would suggest a uniform demand shock); it is selective deployment that follows the compound's structural-opportunity vs structural-uncertainty pattern. Companies are making capex decisions that survive the compound rather than depending on its resolution.

IV.A · Cross-proxy synthesis — what the six series say together

Read individually, each series is informative but limited. EPU is textual and can be sensitive to news cycles; business confidence is survey-based and can reflect respondent framing; cash holdings can reflect treasury policy independent of investment opportunity; M&A volumes can reflect financing-market conditions rather than strategic appetite; IPO activity can reflect public-market valuation environment; capex can be compositionally driven by sector mix. Read together, and this is the empirical claim, they describe a single coherent pattern: sustained operating-environment uncertainty over four-plus years has produced cumulative decision-deferral across capital allocation, capital formation, capital deployment, and forward expectations, and the pattern has the persistence and coherence of a regime-shift transition rather than a transient shock.

Persistence: prior major shocks (COVID, GFC, dot-com) produced similar decision-deferral patterns but with materially shorter elevated periods before mean reversion, typically 18-36 months from peak uncertainty to early signs of decision normalisation. The Russia-Ukraine compound has now sustained elevated decision-deferral across all six proxies for over 50 months, with no proxy yet showing decisive mean reversion to pre-2022 baselines. This duration matches the historical pattern not of transient shocks but of the regime-shift transitions that Section IV.B documents.

Coherence: the six proxies move together. EPU elevation correlates with business confidence depression; both correlate with cash accumulation; cash accumulation correlates with M&A and IPO compression; M&A compression correlates with capex deferral in non-defense sectors. The simultaneous activation across every observable proxy is what an operating-environment effect looks like empirically, not a sector-specific or domain-specific phenomenon. The Psychology cluster is empirically what happens to the rate of decision across the operating environment, and the rate has been depressed across every layer at which it can be measured.

B · The historical regime-shift record — seven transitions, 110 years

The Psychology cluster's signature in the current compound is informative only against a benchmark, what does sustained cluster activation actually produce, given the historical record? The benchmark is empirical: the major modern crisis transitions of the last 110 years and what they crystallised into. Seven transitions are documented here in the canonical Vol II before/after format, with the explicit question for each: what was the pre-transition operating regime, what triggered its breakdown, how long did crystallization take, and what was structurally not restored. The empirical regularity across all seven transitions is what underwrites the configuration-crystallization claim that Vol I §V.5 develops.

IV.B.1 · WWI (1914-1918) → Interwar regime

Sources: Eichengreen, B. (1992). Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939 (Oxford University Press); Findlay, R. & O'Rourke, K. H. (2007). Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium (Princeton University Press); Maddison Project Database (historical GDP and trade data); BIS Annual Report historical archives.

What the data shows: the first globalization that ran from roughly the 1870s through August 1914, gold standard convertibility, free capital movement, low tariffs in the Cobden-Chevalier liberal era, integrated financial markets centered on London, was the operating regime that Europe entered the war within, and it broke within weeks of mobilisation. The September 1914 collapse of the London discount market closed the financial-market layer of the regime. The crystallization that followed took five to seven years to settle into a recognisably new regime, with high tariffs escalating immediately post-war and culminating in Smoot-Hawley 1930, capital controls replacing pre-war free movement, and a fragmented monetary system after multiple failed gold standard restoration attempts (Britain 1925, France 1928, abandoned by 1931-1933 across countries). Trade-to-GDP ratios did not return to their 1913 levels until the 1970s, over fifty years later. The pre-1914 first globalization regime was structurally unrestorable, and the historical record subsequently shows that the interwar regime itself crystallised, ran for approximately fourteen years, and then collapsed into the next transition.

IV.B.2 · 1929 Crash → New Deal / managed-capitalism regime

Sources: Friedman, M., & Schwartz, A. (1963). A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton University Press); Galbraith, J. K. (1955). The Great Crash; Kindleberger, C. P. (1973). The World in Depression, 1929-1939; NBER historical recession dating and banking-crisis chronology.

What the data shows: 1920s laissez-faire capitalism, limited financial regulation, no deposit insurance, minimal securities oversight, restored gold standard since 1925, Republican administrative philosophy of minimal federal intervention, Federal Reserve operating under real-bills doctrine, produced the configuration that the October 1929 crash exposed. The acute phase was severe: approximately 9,000 bank failures between 1930 and 1933, GDP contraction of approximately 25% peak-to-trough, deflation of approximately 25% over the same period, unemployment peak of approximately 25%. The crystallization that followed took five to eight years to settle into a recognisably new regime, with the New Deal legislation cascade defining the new architecture, Glass-Steagall Banking Act 1933, Securities Act 1933, Securities Exchange Act 1934, Social Security Act 1935, Wagner Act 1935, Banking Act 1935. The new regime was managed capitalism with an active federal economic role, financial regulation, deposit insurance, securities oversight, and labor protections, substantially crystallised by 1937 and consolidated through the 1940s. The pre-1929 laissez-faire structure was never restored; managed capitalism ran approximately 34 years until the next transition (1971).

IV.B.3 · WWII (1939-1945) → Bretton Woods / postwar order

Sources: Eichengreen, B. (2008). Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton University Press); Steil, B. (2013). The Battle of Bretton Woods (Council on Foreign Relations); Helleiner, E. (1994). States and the Reemergence of Global Finance (Cornell University Press); World Bank and IMF historical archives.

What the data shows: the interwar fragmented order, high tariffs, capital controls, competing currency blocs (sterling area, dollar area, franc bloc, mark/reichsmark sphere), no functioning multilateral institutions, and a multipolar political order in Europe with rising authoritarianism through the 1930s, was the configuration that the war broke. Crystallization took approximately five to seven years from the July 1944 Bretton Woods conference to operational settlement, with the postwar architecture defined by IMF and World Bank charters (1944), the United Nations charter (June 1945), the Marshall Plan (1948-1951), NATO (1949), GATT (1948), and the European Coal and Steel Community (1951, the precursor to subsequent European integration). The new regime, US-led multilateral order with fixed exchange rates pegged to dollar-gold, GATT trade liberalisation, multilateral economic institutions, NATO security architecture, ran approximately twenty-seven years (1944-1971) before its monetary architecture was modified by the Nixon shock. The pre-war multipolar fragmented order was never restored.

IV.B.4 · 1971 Nixon shock + 1970s oil shocks → Neoliberal order

Sources: Eichengreen, B. (2007). The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond (Princeton University Press); Krippner, G. R. (2011). Capitalising on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance (Harvard University Press); Stein, J. (2010). Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies (Yale University Press); BIS historical archives on capital account liberalisation timeline.

What the data shows: the Bretton Woods order that ran from 1944 to 1971, fixed exchange rates pegged to dollar-gold convertibility, capital controls, managed-capitalism domestic policy with high marginal tax rates, strong unions, regulated industries, and Keynesian demand-management as macroeconomic policy norm, broke in stages. The August 1971 Nixon end of dollar-gold convertibility was the formal break; the 1973 Yom Kippur war and Arab oil embargo (oil prices quadrupling) was the substrate disruption; the 1973-1975 stagflation was the regime-failure observation; the 1979 second oil shock and the 1979-1982 Volcker disinflation (US federal funds rate reaching 19%) was the resolution mechanism. Crystallization took approximately five to ten years to settle into the new regime. The major architectural elements settled in sequence, floating exchange rates from 1973, capital account liberalisation through the late 1970s and 1980s (UK 1979, Japan late 1970s/early 1980s, European countries through 1980s, completed by 1990s), financial deregulation (Big Bang 1986, US S&L deregulation, Glass-Steagall erosion through to its formal 1999 repeal), industry deregulation (airlines 1978, trucking, telecom), tax-rate reductions (Reagan 1981 and 1986, Thatcher from 1979), labor-union retrenchment, and inflation-targeting monetary policy. The neoliberal order ran approximately twenty-eight years (1980-2008) before the GFC modified its financial-architecture components. Managed-capitalism Keynesianism was never restored.

IV.B.5 · End of Cold War (1989-1991) → Unipolar moment

Sources: Krasner, S. (1999). Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press); Acharya, A. (2014). The End of American World Order (Polity); Brzezinski, Z. (2012). Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power (Basic Books); OECD historical economic statistics; EU Eurostat historical accession data.

What the data shows: the Cold War bipolar order that ran from approximately 1947 to 1989, US-Soviet strategic competition, NATO-Warsaw Pact military blocs, ideological competition between liberal democratic capitalism and state socialism, parallel economic spheres (COMECON and OECD-aligned), and strategic-nuclear deterrence framework, broke in stages from 1989 to 1991. Crystallization of the new unipolar moment took approximately five to ten years across multiple institutional dimensions. NATO expansion to Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland was completed in 1999, then to Baltic states and others in 2004. EU expansion brought Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995, then a ten-country expansion in 2004. WTO formation in 1995 succeeded GATT; China's WTO accession in 2001 marked structural integration; and the unipolar US security primacy doctrine settled through the late 1990s. The unipolar moment ran approximately seventeen years (1991-2008) before the GFC and the rise of multipolar competition modified its substrate. The bipolar Cold War order was never restored.

IV.B.6 · 2008 GFC → QE-era / macroprudential regime

Sources: Adrian, T., & Shin, H. S. (2010). "Liquidity and leverage." Journal of Financial Intermediation; Bernanke, B. S. (2015). The Courage to Act (W. W. Norton); Tooze, A. (2018). Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (Viking); BIS Annual Economic Report series (2009-2021).

What the data shows: the late-neoliberal financial architecture that ran from the 1980s into 2008, financial deregulation, securitisation as primary credit-allocation mechanism, off-balance-sheet vehicles, originate-to-distribute mortgage origination, OTC derivatives growth without central clearing, low capital requirements under Basel II's internal-ratings-based approach, was the configuration that the August 2007 BNP Paribas withdrawal from money market funds began to expose, that March 2008 Bear Stearns collapse confirmed, and that September 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and AIG bailout brought into acute phase. Crystallization took approximately five to eight years, with the new architecture defined by the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), Basel III (2010), macroprudential policy as new central-bank toolkit, quantitative easing as standard monetary policy instrument (Fed 2008-2014, ECB OMT 2012 then PSPP 2015, BOJ Abenomics 2013), zero and negative interest rate policy (ZIRP/NIRP) across advanced economies, and central-bank balance sheet expansion of 5-10x pre-crisis levels. The QE-era ran approximately thirteen years (2008-2021) before pandemic and inflation modifications. The pre-GFC financial-architecture was never restored.

IV.B.7 · 2020 COVID → still crystallizing

Sources: Adrian, T., Erceg, C., Lindé, J., Zabczyk, P., & Zhou, J. (2020). "A quantitative microfounded model for the integrated policy framework." IMF Working Paper; Tooze, A. (2021). Shutdown: How Covid Shook the World's Economy (Viking); BIS Annual Economic Report 2021-2024; IMF World Economic Outlook series (2020-2026).

What the data shows: the late-QE-era globalised order that ran from approximately 2014 into 2020, integrated supply chains optimised for cost (just-in-time inventories, China-centred manufacturing), low inflation regime, suppressed nominal yields, services-sector dominance of advanced-economy employment, in-person work norms, and global mobility frameworks, was the configuration that the February-March 2020 pandemic onset broke. Crystallization is still in progress, five to six years in. Visible elements that appear to be crystallising include persistence of remote and hybrid work across knowledge-economy sectors, ongoing supply-chain reconfiguration (nearshoring, friend-shoring, reshoring), structural fiscal expansion with deficits and debt levels above pre-2020, an inflation regime shift from the 2010s 0-2% range to the 2020s 2-4% range across advanced economies, nominal yield repricing, and sustained tightness in housing and labor markets. The pre-2020 regime will not return; what specifically crystallises, partial deglobalisation, re-globalisation in altered form, regional blocs, or some configuration not yet visible, remains the open question. The Russia-Ukraine compound from February 2022 has interacted with and modified the COVID crystallization trajectory, which is itself part of why current compound conditions are difficult to read against a clean comparison.

C · What the historical record and the current proxies say together

Across the seven historical transitions, the empirical regularity is consistent. The pre-transition regime in each case is recognisable in retrospect, its operating norms, its institutional architecture, its policy framework, its substrate assumptions. The trigger event in each case is distinct (war, financial crisis, monetary regime change, geopolitical reordering, pandemic) but the post-trigger crystallization pattern is similar: approximately five to ten years from trigger to a new regime substantially settling into operational form, with the prior regime structurally unrestorable across all seven cases. Zero observed instances of return-to-pre-shock-baseline.

Crystallization durations across the seven transitions cluster between five and ten years: WWI approximately five to seven, 1929 approximately five to eight, WWII approximately five to seven, 1971 approximately five to ten, end of Cold War approximately five to ten, GFC approximately five to eight, COVID currently five to six years in with crystallization ongoing. The mean across the six completed transitions is approximately seven years; the range is five to ten. This is the empirical band against which the current Russia-Ukraine compound must be read.

The current decision-cost proxies in Section IV.A read, against this benchmark, as the early-mid stage signature of a configuration crystallization rather than as a transient shock. The four-plus year persistence of EPU elevation, business confidence depression, cash accumulation, M&A and IPO compression, and capex bifurcation all exceed the duration windows characteristic of prior transient shocks (which produce 18-36 month elevations before mean reversion) and match the duration windows characteristic of the early-mid crystallization phase. The Russia-Ukraine compound began February 2022; on the historical pattern, with a bifurcation 12-18 months ahead (Q3 2026 - Q1 2027 per Vol I §V), the new-regime crystallization horizon runs through approximately 2032-2037.

What the data says here is empirical. The methodology claim, that the conventional return-to-baseline framing is structurally wrong, that the new operating regime is what corporate decisions need to be positioned against, that PHM composes both causal and temporal cross-coupling against this empirical record, is developed in Vol I §V.5. The data and the historical record sit here, in Vol II, as the empirical foundation that §V.5 draws on.

Section IV glossary (abbreviations)

EPU, Economic Policy Uncertainty index (Baker-Bloom-Davis).

ESI, European Sentiment Indicator (European Commission DG ECFIN, Eurozone-aggregate).

ifo, Information und Forschung Institute (Munich); German business climate index.

INSEE, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (French national statistical office).

ISTAT, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (Italian national statistics institute).

DG ECFIN, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs.

BIS, Bank for International Settlements (Basel).

NBER, National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, MA).

OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Paris).

IMF, International Monetary Fund (Washington).

BLS, Bureau of Labor Statistics (US Department of Labor).

M&A, mergers and acquisitions.

IPO, initial public offering.

SPAC, special purpose acquisition company.

GFC, global financial crisis (2008).

QE, quantitative easing.

ZIRP, Zero Interest Rate Policy.

NIRP, Negative Interest Rate Policy.

GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1948-1995).

WTO, World Trade Organization (1995+).

COMECON, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Soviet-bloc economic organisation, 1949-1991).

ESM, European Stability Mechanism.

OMT, Outright Monetary Transactions (ECB programme).

PSPP, Public Sector Purchase Programme (ECB asset-purchase programme).

FDIC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (US, established by Banking Act of 1933).

SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission (US, established by Securities Exchange Act of 1934).

BOJ, Bank of Japan.

SNB, Swiss National Bank.

V · Markets repricing across the configuration

Cross-chain market data showing how the compound has repriced asset classes simultaneously.

Equities — defense industrial reconstitution

Fig. 13Defense industrial equities composite — EU primes vs US primes (Feb 2022 = 100)

Sources: XETRA/LSE/Borsa Italiana/Euronext historical (Rheinmetall, BAE, Saab, Leonardo, Thales, Hensoldt, Kongsberg) vs Lockheed, RTX

Sources: XETRA, LSE, Stockholm, Milan, Paris, Oslo, NYSE historical price data via Yahoo Finance, MacroTrends, MarketBeat (October 2025 and June 2026 references).

What the data shows: European defense primes have produced 3-14× returns over four years, Rheinmetall the largest single-name appreciation, Hensoldt and Kongsberg next-tier exceptional, Leonardo and Saab in the high middle range. US defense primes have produced more modest 1.5-1.6× returns, the differential captures the asymmetric impact of the cascade: European fiscal cascade (A2) and bilateral defense aid (A3) flow primarily into European defense industrial capacity rather than US prime-contractor capacity. The 2026 retracements from 2025 peaks reflect sectoral consolidation rather than configuration reversal, Rheinmetall's €135B projected end-2026 backlog is the empirical reason the fundamental case has not deteriorated.

Sovereign credit — the European spread differentiation

Fig. 14Sovereign credit inversion — Italian BTP-Bund 251→59 bp vs French OAT-Bund widening

Sources: ING; Italian MEF spread analysis; Trading Economics; ECB

Sources: ING "French political storm" (8 September 2025); Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) "Benefits for businesses, families and finance: the spread that tells the story of Italy" (2026); Trading Economics French government bond yield news (2 January 2026); Freenance French OAT 2026 Investing Guide (May 2026); Finarmour Borsa Italiana BTP guide (December 2025).

What the data shows: a sovereign credit inversion that no analyst would have predicted in 2022. Italy, historically considered Eurozone peripheral, with debt-to-GDP at 135%, has structurally tightened against German Bunds from 251 bp to 59 bp, a compression of 192 bp over three years driven by political stability under Meloni and disciplined fiscal management under Finance Minister Giorgetti. France, historically considered Eurozone core, with debt-to-GDP at 113%, has widened against Bunds and now trades at yields above Italian BTPs. The French political instability (snap elections July 2024, Barnier government collapse December 2024, Lecornu emergency budget January 2026) is the proximate driver, but the structural substrate is the A2 fiscal cascade (defense spending against existing deficit constraint) plus the D2 political-economic absorption (RN polling lead for 2027). The sovereign credit market is pricing the configuration directly.

Commodities — energy and materials regime change

Sources: ICE TTF futures, NYMEX Brent, LME nickel/palladium/aluminum, CBOT wheat, COMEX gold; Trading Economics commodity tracker (June 2026).

What the data shows: TTF gas has structurally rebased at 2-3× pre-invasion levels with sustained volatility. Brent has partly normalized but oscillates around a higher floor than pre-2022. Palladium spiked dramatically and then normalized below pre-invasion levels as automotive demand softened. Nickel spiked, broke the LME briefly, then normalized, but the supply chain reorganization persists. Gold reached structural new highs ($3,200/oz current) as non-Western central banks sustain record purchasing pace; the gold price is the cleanest commodity expression of the C1 custody architecture precedent.

FX — ruble, euro, dollar repricing

Sources: Reuters/Bloomberg FX historical data, Central Bank of Russia exchange rate announcements, ECB reference rates.

What the data shows: the ruble's stabilization is heavily managed through capital controls, mandatory exporter conversion requirements, and elevated CBR rates. The euro's structural weakness against the dollar (broke parity briefly September 2022) reflected the energy cascade plus US relative monetary tightening; the recovery has been modest. The Swiss franc strengthened against the euro through the period, partly capturing safe-haven demand for European-jurisdiction non-EU custody.

Section V glossary (abbreviations)

P/E, price-to-earnings ratio (equity valuation multiple).

MATIF, Marché à terme international de France (Euronext Paris commodity futures, including milling wheat benchmark).

VI · What the data says about Phase 5

The data series in this document have a directional consistency that the methodology reads as evidence of configuration persistence rather than transient disruption. The series that have moved decisively in one direction over four years:

Defense industrial expansion (A1, A2, A3), sustained increase, structurally locked in via Hague commitment to 2035. Energy regime change (B1) — sustained higher TTF baseline, permanent legal ban on Russian gas effective 2027. Critical raw materials repositioning (B2) — gradual European diversification, sustained Russian trade routing through third countries. Russian internal economy distortion (D3) — sustained two-track manufacturing pattern, sustained labor and capital constraints. European political-economic absorption (D2) — sustained voter coalition shift across multiple countries. Custody architecture precedent (C1) — sustained non-Western central bank gold accumulation, sustained reserve diversification. European banking exit pattern (C3) — settled at structurally differentiated configuration (SocGen exited; UniCredit/Intesa reduced; RBI retained). Ukrainian displacement substrate (D1) — sustained at 4.33M TPD with TPD legal architecture extended. Transatlantic split (E2) — sustained reduction in US engagement, sustained European autonomous capability building. Hybrid threshold normalization (E1) — sustained operational space below Article 5.

Two series remain in active resolution:

Peace-plan bifurcation (E3), open, fork closure projected within 12-18 months of June 2026. Specific market price levels — cyclical noise within configuration-driven structural levels.

The methodology's reading: Phase 4 (Restructuring) is empirically resolved. Phase 5 (Resolution) is the bifurcation point. The series above will continue to evolve along the trajectories visible in this document until the bifurcation closes. After the bifurcation closes, branch-specific data layers (Branch A or Branch B) will become the operative substrate. The methodology's forward read against the corpus produces dated cascade compositions for each branch.

VII · For the reader

This data layer is the empirical companion to the methodology demonstration. Every named-position implication in the main report has an auditable substrate here. Every cascade signature has a numerical anchor.

For practitioners who need to verify the methodology's operation against this particular compound: every data point in this document drills to primary source via the citations below. The numbers are public. The before/after framing is what the configuration produces. The methodology is what reads it.

The reader who has worked through both documents has the substrate, the numbers, and the integration. What remains is the named-position decision, your seat, your book, your time horizon. The configuration operates against that decision whether or not you have a named position in it. The data here is what enables the decision to be made on substrate rather than narrative.

Primary sources for the data layer

This data layer draws on the same primary source base as the main foundational report. Specific data series in this document are anchored to:

Defense industrial: Rheinmetall AG investor relations (ir.rheinmetall.com), MacroTrends RNMBY historical data, MarketBeat 5-year return analytics, Yahoo Finance XETRA RHM.DE quotes, MEXC defense sector analysis (11 March 2026). European defense primes individual data: BAE Systems, Saab, Leonardo, Thales, Hensoldt, Kongsberg via respective exchange historical data. US defense primes via NYSE/Nasdaq historical data.

Defense spending: EPThinkTank "EU Member States' defence budgets" (March 2026); Atlantic Council NATO defense spending tracker (9 April 2026); EPRS European Parliament defense budget tracker; Scope Ratings sovereign credit analysis (30 June 2025); Intereconomics "Can Europe Deliver NATO's Five Percent?" (Vol. 61, 2026); Wikipedia "Agreement on 5% NATO defence spending by 2035".

Ukraine aid: Kiel Institute Ukraine Support Tracker (April 2026, February 2026, December 2025 updates); Statista Ukraine aid chart (May 2026).

Energy: ICE Dutch TTF Natural Gas Futures historical data; Trading Economics EU Natural Gas commodity tracker; Bloomberg "Uniper Posts €40 Billion Loss as Russia Throttles Gas Supply" (3 November 2022); Euronews "Pawn in energy stand-off, Germany's Uniper suffers $12.5 billion loss" (17 August 2022); PressReader "Uniper to be nationalised" (22 September 2022); RT/Reuters Uniper bailout cost coverage (23-24 November 2022); Euronews "EU lawmakers agree to ban Russian gas imports by 2027" (3 December 2025); GIS Reports "EU bans all Russian gas for good" (21 April 2026).

Critical raw materials: Investigate Europe "Russia: Europe imports €13 billion of 'critical' metals" data; MIT Sloan Management Review (10 May 2022); World Economic Forum "future of critical raw materials in Ukraine" (July 2024); LME nickel suspension reporting (March 2022); COMEX/NYMEX historical commodity prices.

Grain and food: USDA grain trade data; S&P Global Commodity Insights; Ukrainian Grain Association; Romanian Constanța port authority data; CBOT wheat futures historical.

Custody and reserves: ABA Banking Journal "Fortress Russia" (10 June 2022); World Gold Council quarterly purchasing data; IMF COFER quarterly reserves data; SWIFT RMB Tracker; VBL GoldFix substack analysis; Reuters/Market Screener EU frozen-assets coverage (December 2025); Centre for European Reform "The Ukraine Reparations Loan" (18 December 2025).

Shadow economy: Newsweek shadow fleet analysis (May 2026); ACLED enforcement action data; World Bank bilateral trade data (Russia-Turkey, Russia-Armenia, Russia-Kyrgyzstan, Russia-Kazakhstan); RUSI Iranian-Russian cooperation reporting.

European banking: Cyprus Mail (Reuters) "Which international banks are exposed to Russia?" (2 March 2022); Euromoney "Why are Raiffeisen and UniCredit still in Russia?" (Nov-Dec 2022); The Bell "Foreign banks in Russia after four years of the war" (6 April 2026); S&P Global Market Intelligence "EU banks with Russia exposure boost profits" (10 July 2024); BIS bank exposure data.

Displacement: Eurostat monthly Temporary Protection Directive statistics (most recent: 31 March 2026 data via 8 May 2026 release); UNHCR refugee data; Visit Ukraine compilation; ETIAS TPD legal analysis (23 September 2025); Frontliner Ukrainian refugee support analysis (April 2026); Pravda Denmark Poland special law repeal coverage (28 May 2026).

European politics: International Bar Association "The year of elections: The rise of Europe's far right"; ECPS "A Tipping Point for Far-Right Populism in France" (4 March 2025); Al Majalla "A rising far right is reshaping Europe's political landscape" (20 November 2025); ECFR "Rise to the challengers: Europe's populist parties and its foreign policy future" (29 January 2026); TIME "Why Europe's Far Right Will Keeps Rising" (11 March 2026); The Conversation "The far right is surging in France, Germany and parts of Europe" (May 2026).

Russian economy: World Bank Fall 2025 Economic Update (October 2025); IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2026); BOFIT "Forecast for Russia 2026-2028" (30 March 2026); Atlantic Council "Russian economy in 2025: Between stagnation and militarization" (12 December 2025); European Leadership Network "Understanding Russia's wartime economy" (20 March 2026); Meduza "Stalling growth, falling oil prices, and the civilian sector sacrificed" (30 December 2025); Moscow Times "Russia's Economy in 2026" (January 2026); Eurasia Business News (29 November 2025); Trading Economics CBR rate news.

Ukrainian domestic economy and financial-sector state (D4): National Bank of Ukraine, Financial Stability Report, June 2026 (approved by NBU Financial Stability Committee 23 June 2026), supervisor-altitude anchor set for GDP contraction and forecast, CPI trajectory, NBU key rate and monetary policy stance, UAH exchange rate dynamics, current account deficit widening, external financing architecture (Ukraine Support Loan €90B, IMF EFF new four-year program, Ukraine Facility, ERA), banking sector capital and liquidity (17%+ CAR, 269% LCR median, NPL 15.3%), sovereign concentration in bank assets (25% domestic government debt securities, 33% public-finance-dependent), banking sector profitability compression under 50% corporate income tax (RoE 22% all / 15% non-state), corporate and retail loan growth (>30% hryvnia corporate, +36% retail, longest 15-year expansion), real sector financial health assessment across 180,000 companies (Box 1), regional distribution including Zakarpattia 68% strong/excellent share vs frontline 43%, household income and consumption dynamics (real income +10% YoY, consumer sentiment above pre-invasion, retail trade expanding), housing market state (mortgage penetration 3%, eOselia 83% of mortgages), CBAM Phase 2 metallurgy loss estimate ($800M 2026), Ukrainian construction steel prices at category granularity (hot-rolled 41,700 UAH/t +18.6% YTD, profile pipes 46,100 UAH/t +20.4%, round pipes 47,100 UAH/t +19.9%). Companion NBU Inflation Report April 2026 provides quarterly forecast trajectory anchors between semi-annual FSR issues.

Hybrid threshold and strategic configuration: International Bar Association "NATO moves to counter hybrid threats" (14 October 2025); CEPA "The Hybrid Threat Imperative" (6 December 2025); Wikipedia "2026 Ukrainian drone incursions into the Baltic states"; Wikipedia "2020s European rearmament"; Pravda Denmark Narvik Agreement coverage (28 May 2026).

Peace plan: CSIS "The Unfinished Plan for Peace in Ukraine: Provision by Provision" (9 February 2026); UK House of Commons Library "Ukraine peace talks" (6 March 2026); Wikipedia "2026 Russo-Ukrainian truce"; Springer Nature "War, diplomacy, and more war: why did the Minsk agreements fail?" (15 November 2024); Peace News Network "When peace processes fail" (2 November 2023).

Sovereign credit spreads: Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance MEF "Benefits for businesses, families and finance: the spread that tells the story of Italy" (2026); ING "French political storm: What it means for bonds and the euro" (8 September 2025); Trading Economics French government bond yield news (2 January 2026); Freenance French OAT 2026 Investing Guide (May 2026); Finarmour Borsa Italiana BTP 2026 guide (December 2025).

Equity and FX: XETRA, LSE, Stockholm Exchange, Borsa Italiana, Euronext Paris, Oslo Bors, NYSE, Nasdaq historical price data via Yahoo Finance, MacroTrends, MarketBeat. ECB reference rates, Reuters/Bloomberg FX historical data, Central Bank of Russia exchange rate announcements.

Psychology cluster decision-cost proxies (Section IV.A): Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., & Davis, S. J. (2016). "Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty." Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(4); Baker-Bloom-Davis EPU index monthly data (policyuncertainty.com); ifo Institute Munich Business Climate Index; INSEE Business Climate Indicator; European Commission DG ECFIN Economic Sentiment Indicator; OECD Business Confidence Indicator (CLI database); S&P Capital IQ corporate cash holdings aggregation (S&P 500 + STOXX 600 non-financial, quarterly); FactSet Earnings Insight weekly S&P 500 cash reporting; company 10-K and annual report disclosures; Refinitiv Deals Intelligence; Bloomberg M&A League Tables; Dealogic global M&A data; Mergermarket; Renaissance Capital US IPO market tracker; Dealogic ECM database; EY Global IPO Trends; PwC IPO Watch; regional exchange disclosures; S&P / STOXX capex aggregation; BloombergNEF energy transition capex; SIPRI defense industrial capex.

Historical regime-shift record (Section IV.B): Eichengreen, B. (1992). Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939 (Oxford); Eichengreen, B. (2007). The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond (Princeton); Eichengreen, B. (2008). Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton); Findlay, R. & O'Rourke, K. H. (2007). Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium (Princeton); Friedman, M., & Schwartz, A. (1963). A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton); Galbraith, J. K. (1955). The Great Crash; Kindleberger, C. P. (1973). The World in Depression, 1929-1939; Steil, B. (2013). The Battle of Bretton Woods (Council on Foreign Relations); Helleiner, E. (1994). States and the Reemergence of Global Finance (Cornell); Krippner, G. R. (2011). Capitalising on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance (Harvard); Stein, J. (2010). Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies (Yale); Krasner, S. (1999). Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton); Acharya, A. (2014). The End of American World Order (Polity); Brzezinski, Z. (2012). Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power (Basic Books); Adrian, T., & Shin, H. S. (2010). "Liquidity and leverage." Journal of Financial Intermediation; Bernanke, B. S. (2015). The Courage to Act (Norton); Tooze, A. (2018). Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (Viking); Tooze, A. (2021). Shutdown: How Covid Shook the World's Economy (Viking); Adrian, T., Erceg, C., Lindé, J., Zabczyk, P., & Zhou, J. (2020). "A quantitative microfounded model for the integrated policy framework." IMF Working Paper. Institutional archives: BIS Annual Report / Annual Economic Report (2009-2024); NBER historical recession dating and banking-crisis chronology; OECD historical economic statistics; IMF World Economic Outlook / COFER quarterly reserves data; World Bank historical archives; Maddison Project Database (historical GDP and trade data); EU Eurostat historical accession data.

Russia · Ukraine · The compound · Before/after data layer Empirical substrate for the methodology demonstration BearingA · companion document to PHM-CMP-0061 Every data series drills to primary source. Configuration-driven moves dominate cyclical noise. contact@bearinga.com · bearinga.com